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Abstract
Studies of sequential decision-making in humans frequently find suboptimal performance relative to an ideal actor that has
perfect knowledge of the model of how rewards and events are generated in the environment. Rather than being
suboptimal, we argue that the learning problem humans face is more complex, in that it also involves learning the structure
of reward generation in the environment. We formulate the problem of structure learning in sequential decision tasks using
Bayesian reinforcement learning, and show that learning the generative model for rewards qualitatively changes the
behavior of an optimal learning agent. To test whether people exhibit structure learning, we performed experiments
involving a mixture of one-armed and two-armed bandit reward models, where structure learning produces many of the
qualitative behaviors deemed suboptimal in previous studies. Our results demonstrate humans can perform structure
learning in a near-optimal manner.
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Introduction
From a squirrel deciding where to bury its nuts to a scientist
selecting the next experiment, all decision-making organisms must
balance exploration of alternatives against exploitation of known
options in developing action plans. Finding a balance is equivalent
to knowing when you can profit from learning about new options
and knowing when you know enough. However, determining
when exploration is profitable is itself a decision problem that
requires understanding or learning about the statistical structure of
the environment. Theoretical work on optimal exploration [1,2]
shows that assessing the long-term value of exploration involves
integrating the predicted informational value of exploration with
primary reward. Predicting the value of future information
requires having a model of the reward generation process for
the domain.
The structure learning problem may be present in tasks with as
few as two options. Suppose, for example, that you interact with
the environment by choosing one of the two options at discrete
choice points and that the option chosen generates a stochastic
binary reward. As a rational agent, your aim is to maximize the
total reward from the environment, but the difficulty is that the
rate of reward for each option is unknown and must be learned. In
this simple setting, there may be several hypothesis about how the
reward generation process works—how actions, observations and
unknowns are structurally ‘‘connected.’’ We propose three kinds of
structures that capture several versions of sequential decision-
making tasks available in the literature. The first structure has
temporal dependency between the present probability of reward
and the past probability of reward, investigated in the context of
Multi-Armed Bandit problems [3–5]. When this dependency involves a
random walk, the environment becomes non-stationary and a
rational agent will discount both past reward observations [6] and
potential future reward (equivalent to discounting) and it will
exhibit a higher learning rate in the sense of a greater dependence
on recent reward information. In the second structure, reward
probabilities can be affected by actions. For example, choosing an
option may temporarily decrease the reward probability. Different
kinds of action-reward probability contingencies can produce a
range of different rational responses, from probability matching
(foraging) to maximization. The third structure is reward coupling
and is the primary focus of this paper.
To illustrate what structure learning entails, Fig. 1A shows a
probabilistic graphical model representing the possible relation-
ships between variables for a typical sequential decision task with
two outcomes. In the graph, nodes represent unknown or
observable quantities and links represent statistical contingencies
between them. The unknown probabilities of reward at a given
time t{1 for both option 1 and 2 are represented by h1 and h2,
respectively. Taking action at{1 at time t{1 produces a reward x
that can be either 0 (failure) or 1 (success). Learning the success
probabilities must be balanced with the desire to maximize
expected future reward. Different assumptions about the connec-
tivity (structure) between variables produce a surprising range of
rational responses. One of those structures is temporal dependency (see
Fig. 1B) between success probabilities. In this case, rather than




2 depend on past
values h1 and h2 [3,4]. The second structure includes an effect of
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action-reward probability contingencies can produce a range of
different rational responses, from matching to maximization [7,8].
Fig. 1D illustrates Reward coupling which determines whether the
reward probabilities are related to each other. For example,
options may be probabilistically coupled so that if one option is
‘‘good’’ the other must be ‘‘bad’’. This type of structure has
profound consequences on exploratory and exploitative behavior.
To illustrate reward coupling, imagine you are serving a ball in
tennis against an opponent who almost always adopts the same
position near the center of the court. How do you choose whether
you serve left or right? Assume the defender must anticipate and
make its choice to defend left or right before it sees your serve.
Clearly you should take advantage of the previous history of
successful and unsuccessful serves against this opponent to try to
exploit any weakness, but how you should make use of this history
depends on what you can learn from your choices. For example, if
you last served left and failed, can you infer it would have been
better to serve right? The answer depends critically on the way
options are probabilistically related. The outcomes of an
anticipatory defender are probabilistically coupled - its probability
of selecting left is one minus its probability of selecting right
(similar to a coin flip). For coupled outcomes, what can be learned
on each trial is independent of your actions and no active
exploration is needed.
Author Summary
Every decision-making experiment has a structure that
specifies how rewards are obtained, which is usually
explained to the subject at the beginning of the
experiment. Participants frequently fail to act as if they
understand the experimental structure, even in tasks as
simple as determining which of two biased coins they
should choose to maximize the number of trials that
produce ‘‘heads’’. We hypothesize that participants’
behavior is not driven by top-down instructions—rather,
participants must learn through experience how the
rewards are generated. We formalize this hypothesis using
a fully rational optimal Bayesian reinforcement learning
approach that models optimal structure learning in
sequential decision making. In an experimental test of
structure learning in humans, we show that humans learn
reward structure from experience in a near optimal
manner. Our results demonstrate that behavior purported
to show that humans are error-prone and suboptimal
decision makers can result from an optimal learning
approach. Our findings provide a compelling new family
of rational hypotheses for behavior previously deemed
irrational, including under- and over-exploration.
Figure 1. Different structures in sequential decision-making. A) General structure. Arcs highlighted denote B) temporal dependency
between success probabilities, C) action-dependent reward state leading to different optimality principles—from foraging to maximization and D)
reward coupling affecting exploration vs. exploitation demands.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g001
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right—with the goal of determining which target is easier to hit. In
this case, you can infer little from a failure on the left target about
your success on the right. The options are independent, which
means that observing one option tells you little or nothing about
the other. Exploration is then necessary for learning, and your
choices impact what can be learned. Thus, the kind of probabilistic
dependence between options determines whether passive (action
independent) or active learning strategies are needed.
An organism with initial ignorance about the environment will
not have a model of the probabilistic coupling, and thus will not
know the value of exploration. But how can it know what kind of
probabilistic dependence is present?
In this work, we investigate the possibility that people learn
models of reward generation using rational analysis. From a
rational perspective, actions should be selected both to increase
reward and to provide information about the reward generation
process. Probabilistic methods for learning dependencies between
variables are termed structure learning or causal learning, and has
been an active topic within the machine learning community. We
argue that structure learning plays a major role in human
sequential decision making. Because structure denotes the
statistical relationships between entities and events, it forms the
basis for generating future predictions, and it enables model-based
approaches to reinforcement learning.
Using model-based (Bayesian) reinforcement learning [9–12]
optimal exploration can be extended to handle uncertainty across
a set of plausible reward generation models. In one formulation we
follow here, latent parameters on model structure are treated as a
hidden state, such that the algorithm tries to find values of the
hidden state that maximize expected discounted reward. In
essence, at the beginning of a set of tasks, we assume there is
initial uncertainty over a parametric family of structures—causal
models of reward generation. The learning of this causal structure
is then incorporated into acting. This is a natural extension of
causal induction (predictive of behavior in simpler tasks [13]) to
sequential experimentation.
To maximize the differences that uncertainty about the causal
relationships between options would produce, we exposed subjects
to one of two possible models that represent two extremes in the
exploration– exploitation trade-off in a slot-machine gambling
environment, where the probabilistic coupling between the payoffs
between machines must be learned. Using Bayesian RL to
generate an optimal exploratory agent for this environment, we
show that optimal actions with reward model uncertainty include
exploratory actions that are specific to model learning, and exhibit
patterns that would be considered over- and under- exploration for
an agent without reward model uncertainty. We demonstrate that
humans are able to learn the probabilistic coupling structure for
this environment, and that they exhibit exploratory choice
behavior predicted by reward model learning.
Results
Participants made decisions in a set of 32 two-option tasks, each
terminating stochastically, with an average of 48 trials. For each
task, an option produced an stochastic binary reward with a fixed
probability that had to be estimated by the participant.
Participants were asked to maximized their reward gathered for
the whole experiment and were compensated in proportion to the
total reward.
Formally, the choice of option 1 or 2 transitions the agent into that
state, and generates an observable binary reward x1 and x2,
respectively. The reward distributions are initially unknown but
remain constant within a task, which ends stochastically with a
probability 1{c. At the end of each task the reward distributions are
reset. The tasks are analogous to playing slot machines in a casino.
There are two slot machines. The state of the environment x
represents which of the slot machines is active. Actions involve
selecting which of the machines to activate (pull the slot machine
lever), and active machines generate binary rewards probabilistically.
To experimentally test how well humans can learn the
probabilistic coupling structure of an environment, we used two
environments with different reward structure designed to generate
clear differences in decisions and exploratory behavior. In the first
environment, which we term independent, the reward distributions
for each machine are independent. In the second environment,
called coupled, the two reward distributions are coupled by sharing
a common cause: when one option gives reward, the other will not.
The optimal policies for these environments generate exploratory
behavior that span the range of possibilities, from independent
where exploration is necessary to coupled, where exploration is
superfluous. An agent with uncertainty about whether the
environment is coupled or independent will need to learn both
the coupling structure and the reward values of the options.
The environments were presented as two distinctive ‘‘blocks’’ of
tasks. Each block was presented as a ‘‘game room’’ and machines
in that game room had a unique color (blue in one room and
yellow in the other). Unknown to the subjects, however, the first
block of 16 tasks corresponded to one reward structure and the
second block of 16 tasks corresponded to other reward structure.
We argue that it would be unreasonable for participants to
assume a reward structure beforehand. They, instead, have to
perform an estimation of this structure through a block of tasks
while jointly learning the reward rates within the task. To predict
human decisions in the task, we develop a normative model that
makes decisions while actively gathering evidence about both task
structure and the rewards available at each option and compare its
performance both to other normative models that assume a fixed
task structure and to model-free RL based on Q-learning with soft-
max action selection.
Structure learning model with Bayesian reinforcement
learning
In general, structure learning involves estimating the underlying
dependency structure between variables. Such learning has been
formulated as a probabilistic inference problem, where inference is
performed over a family of hypothesized dependencies. Within
machine learning, it is common to represent these dependencies
using graphical models, in which nodes are variables and
conditional dependencies between variables can be represented
as edges.
More specifically, a graphical model conveys knowledge on how
a joint probability distribution can be factored into multiple known
conditional probabilities. For example, in Fig. 2A, and ignoring all
the plates, the edge from node h1 to node x1 would indicate that
the joint probability distribution p(h1,x1) can be equivalently
written as the product of two known distributions p(x1Dh1)|p(h1).
Additionally, a plate is a shorthand notation for replicating
variables inside it while sharing conditional relationships and
distribution functions. For example, the node h1 inside the plate
with m~1,...,M means that there are M variables
(h11,h12,...,h1M) that have the same known distribution function.
The node x1 is inside a plate with n~1,...,Nm and inside the m
plate, which indicates—quite compactly—that the total set of
nodes is x1m1,x1m2,...,x1mNm for each m[f1,...,Mg. Finally, the
conditional probabilities p(x1mnDh1m), for any n and m, correspond
to the same distribution function.
Structure Learning in Decision-Making
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perform structure learning in graphical models (e.g., [14,15]), and
these have provided a compelling account of human causal
inference and learning in cognitive tasks [13,16]. Below we show
human structure learning in a sequential decision-making task.
However, formulating the structure learning problem within
sequential decision making is significantly more difficult, requiring
a combination of probabilistic inference with reinforcement
learning commonly called Bayesian reinforcement learning.
Bayesian reinforcement learning (BRL) can be used to describe
an agent that learns the structure of rewards in the environment
while performing optimal action selection that balances exploration
and exploitation. Agents interact with a stochastic environment by
performing an action a that affect the state of the environment x by
transitioning to a new state x’ with probability p(x’Dx,a). Rewards
are received with a probability p(rDx,a) that depends on the action
and the outcome of the action. For the agents we are interested in
describing, the goal is to maximize the reward accumulated across
participation in a set of tasks which end stochastically with a
probability 1{c. The optimal BRL agent schedules actions that
maximize the expected reward received during the task:
EB rzcr’zc2r’’z...
  
, where r is the reward to be received
immediately, r’ the reward received next, r’’ the reward received
two steps into the future, and so on, and B is current model of the
environment. In standard model-based reinforcement learning, the
agent uses a probabilistic model of reward sources and environment
tocompute thisexpectation.InBRL,theagentdoesnot knoweither
the reward sources and environment precisely, but rather generates
beliefs over a family of possible models.
After each observation, the belief distribution is updated using
Bayesian inference. By considering the set of possible future
observations, this belief updating can be used to ‘‘look ahead’’ to
predict future rewards that can be achieved from different plans of














In the context of reinforcement learning, a policy is a
prescription of what action should be taken at a particular state.
One of the key ideas in BRL is that the optimal policy can be
described as a mapping from belief states to actions. In particular,









We specialized this framework to model structure learning in
sequential decision experiments (see Materials and Methods for
more details). For the BRL agent with structure learning,
uncertainty about reward dynamics and contingencies can be
modeled by including within the belief state not only reward
probabilities, but also the possibility of independent or coupled
structure. Maximizing the expected reward over this belief state
yields the optimal balance of exploration and exploitation,
resulting in action selection that seeks to simultaneously maximize
(1) immediate expected rewards, (2) information about reward
dynamics and (3) information about task structure.
Fig. 2A represents a graphical model for the generation of
rewards in an independent environment. Rewards xa are samples
from Bernoulli distributions with separate Beta prior distributed
reward probabilities ha for each option. The belief state about ha is
summarized by the counts of the number of successes aa and
failures ba for each option. Fig. 2B shows a graphical model for a
coupled environment. Coupling is represented as a ‘‘shared’’
probability of reward h1 from which the rewards x1 and x2 are
sampled. However, the probability of reward x1 follows a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter h1 whereas x2 follows a
Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1{h1.
To model learning coupling structure, we introduce a hidden
binary state c, representing whether the options are independent
or coupled in the environment. Uncertainty about the coupling
structure generates a mixture between the independent and
coupled environment models. Fig. 2C shows the full graphical
model that incorporates uncertainty about the environment
structure. It is a mixture model of the independent and coupled
environments (Fig. 2A and B.) The parameter c switches between
a coupled environment for c~1 and an independent environment
for c~0 (see Materials and Methods for details.). Structure
uncertainty is captured by a Bernoulli distribution on c with
parameter w, which will change solely based on the rewards
observed.
Without uncertainty, the optimal decision-making strategies for
both the independent and coupled environments are well-known
and relatively simple. The optimal policy for a coupled
Figure 2. Graphical models of reward generation. The agent faces M tasks, each comprising a random number Nm of choices. A) Rewarding
options are independent. B) Rewarding options are coupled within a task. C) Mixture of tasks. Rewarding options may be independent or coupled.
The node c acts as a ‘‘XOR’’ switch between coupled and independent structure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g002
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with the greater number of successes (including failures of the
other option as successes) because the reward observed in one
option tells us everything the reward that would have been received
in the other option. Optimal action selection for an independent
environment, however, involves balancing the exploration–exploi-
tation trade-off. Exploration is required because choosing one
option does not provide information about the other. The optimal
policy for an independent environment involves computing a
quality index for each option, called the Gittins index [18], and
selecting the highest quality option. The Gittins index computes
the maximum expected reward per unit discounted time for each











With uncertainty, optimal action selection depends on the belief
that the environment is coupled, as captured by the parameter c.I n
the methods section, we show that the optimal policy for structure
learning canbe expressedas a mixture of the optimal policies for the
independent and coupled environments. For all the models, the
optimal policy p is a function of the observed counts of successes, sa,
and failures, fa, for each option, and priors a1,b1,a2,b2,w.
To illustrate the behavior of the structure learning model, we
expose the model to a sequence of tasks. The model is placed in
either a coupled or independent environment (Fig. 3A & B). Every
50 trials the reward probabilities on the options are randomly
reset, but the type of environment stays fixed. For both
environments, the structure learning model learns the environ-
ment type, as expressed by the convergence of the posterior
distribution on the c parameter to its true value. For the
parameters h1 and h2, the marginal probability is indicated by
the color, with brighter indicating higher relative probability mass.
The structure learning model quickly learns in both environments,
although it is frequently easier to detect an independent
environment—whenever both options are significantly above or
below chance, the coupled structure can be quickly ruled out.
Once there is high certainty on the structure (p(c~1DD)&0 or
p(c~1DD)&1, where D is the data), beliefs are concentrated on
the parameters that matter for that structure—p(h1DD) and
p(h2DD) becomes concentrated on the reward probabilities of each
Figure 3. Learning simulation of structure learning model. Four tasks of 50 trials each are sequentially shown to the structure learning model.
Priors were a1~b1~a2~b2~1 and w~0:5. Marginal beliefs on reward probabilities (brightness indicates relative probability mass), probability of
coupling and expected reward are shown as functions of time. A) Simulation on Independent Environment B) Simulation on Coupled Environment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g003
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uniform in the coupled environment.
The effect of structure uncertainty on the behavior of the
structure learning model is evident by looking at the expected








where p(cDD) is the posterior probability on the structure given the
data D represented by the counts s1, f1, s2 and f2. If the
probability that the structure is coupled is high (p(c~1DD)&1),
then the expected reward accrues regardless of which action is
chosen. If the probability that the structure is independent
(p(c~1DD)&0) is high, then the expected reward depends only
on the option chosen. Thus the belief about coupling gates the
need for exploration. In an independent model, there is a value
attached to choosing the option with less evidence even if the
current evidence suggests it has a lower probability of success. The








In Fig. 4, we perform a simulation that shows how the structure
learning model described can behave as a independent or coupled
model depending on the uncertainty about coupling belief. We
purposely chose evidence values for which the independent model
would pick one option while the coupled model would pick the
other. When a curve dips below 0, it means that the learning
model would choose option 1, and when it does above 0, it would
pick option 2. Note that the structure learning model can
sometimes behave as a coupled or independent model depending
on the uncertainty about the structure. This difference between
the structure learning model vs. fixed models will play an
important role later when we show that people change their
policy in accord with structure learning.
Model comparison
To quantify structure learning in participant’s decisions, we
compared the predictions of the structure learning model with
models that capture the decisions expected from knowledge of
structure in the absence of learning (fixed independent and
coupled structure). Additionally, we used Q-learning algorithm
[19] with a soft-max action selection [20] as a base model. Q-
learning is a model-free RL method that does not model the
reward probabilities or structure, rather it estimates the value of an
action by compiling over experienced outcomes (called Temporal
Difference learning). However, Q-learning does not balance
exploration and exploitation in a principled way, but rather
performs heuristic explorations based on random actions. It is
proven to estimate the optimal value of an action after infinitely
many observations for every action and state [19]. The temporal
difference aspect of Q-learning as well as the exploratory
interpretation of the soft-max rule have been shown to correlate
with brain activity [4,21,22].
Fitting the models to all the response data, we find that the
structure learning model prediction rate (M~87:7%(87:4,88:1),
N~33904) is better than the coupled model prediction rate
(M~84:4%(84,84:7), N~33904), exact binomial test pone{tailedv
0:01, better than the fixed independent model prediction rate
(M~79%(79,79:9), N~33904), pone{tailedv0:01, and better than
Q-learning model (M~81%(80:981:8), N~33904), pone{tailedv
:01). Note that the Bayesian models have no free parameters,with the
exception of the initial value of the prior belief about coupling
structure w for the structure learning model, which is quickly
swamped by the evidence. However, we allowed for individual
differences in all five parameters of the Q-learning model. For all
models, we assumed uniform priors on probabilities of reward
(aj,bj~1, 1ƒjƒ2, at the beginning of tasks).
The remainder of the results are organized as follows. Because
essentially all models predict well a large number of trials that
occur later in blocks (where evidence is high and the better option
is easy to identify), we focus on the set of trials for which there is at
least one disagreement between the models so that we can better
tell them apart. We call this set of trials diagnostic. We show the
structure learning model can better account for several aspects of
decision-making on diagnostic trials. In particular, we show how
uncertainty in task structure tracks qualitative and quantitative
changes in choice behavior. Then we show that the structure
learning model gives a principled explanation for strategies that
appear suboptimal. Finally, we analyze decisions that are
specifically diagnostic for the structure learning model (structure
learning predicts differently than fixed models) and show that the
structure learning model predicts human choice behavior better
than models with fixed structure.
Participants’ decisions better captured by a structure
learning model. We show 1) participants quickly adapt their
choices to the environment that they are in, independent or
coupled, and 2) normative belief about coupling predicts
participants exploratory moves while learning which type of
environment they are in.
Because optimal policies depend on the observed rewards for
both options, we analyzed participants’ choices as a function of two
measures of the observed successes and failures: evidence and
Figure 4. Effect of task uncertainty on exploration– exploita-
tion of structure learning model. The data available for the options
are s1~1, f1~0, and s2~5 and discount factor c is 0.98, all values fixed
for the simulation. The number of failures for option two (f2) is varied
from 1 through 3. Under these conditions, the independent would
always choose option 1 whereas the coupled model would always
choose option 2. However, the structure learning model switches
between these two The graph shows the difference in values between
the option 2 and 1 as a function of the task uncertainty.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g004
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observation history that preceded it. The evidence measure is the
log odds ratio of the observed reward rate of the better option










wheres andf denotesthe observednumberofsuccesses and failures
respectively and the subscripts b and w denote the better and worse
options, respectively. The confidence measure is the log of the ratio
of the number of observations at each option
Confidence:log sbzfb ðÞ {log swzfw ðÞ ð 5Þ
Together the two measures capture the important aspects of the
observed successes and failures for decision-making, and are
commonly used to analyze proportional data [23]. Evidence
measures which option appears better (in relative terms) based on
the observed frequencies. Confidence measures the relative
reliability of the evidence.
We compile all choices in the diagnostic trials with the same
evidence and confidence and computed the fraction of these
choices to the better option. We separated our analysis for the
independent environment (Fig. 5A, left panel) and coupled
environment (Fig. 5B, left panel). Multiple pair-wise comparisons
between the models reveal that the structure learning model is
significantly better at predicting participants’ decisions than the
rest of the models, pv:001 (Fig. 5A and B, right panels)
Participants’ choices are tracked by structure uncertainty
of structure learning model. To better test whether
participants’ decisions reflect structure learning, we analyze how
coupling belief affected decisions within diagnostic trials. For each
trial, we computed the learning model’s coupling belief for the
sequence of observed rewards (p(c~1DD), where D is the reward
history). We then computed the fraction of choices to the better
option as a function of coupling belief, for both participants and
for each of the models. The results are shown in Fig. 6A,B.
Qualitatively, human choices mirror the structure learning model.
Quantitatively, the structure learning model correlates strongly
with participants in the coupled environment (Fig. 6D),
r(8)~0:85, pv0:01, and less on the independent environment
(Fig. 6B), r(7)~0:53, p~:2. However, the correlation to fixed
models is weaker in both environments (independent environment:
r~{0:39 independent model, r~{0:26 coupled model; coupled
environment: r~{0:45 independent model, r~0:47 coupled
model.). Taken together, these results suggest that people are
behaving remarkably like an optimal structure learning model in a
couple environment, with some unaccounted behavior in an
independent environment.
Behavior deemed suboptimal by fixed structure models
are optimal for structure learning. In the following sections,
we focus on explaining trials that are deemed suboptimal if the
process of reward generation of the environment is assumed
known by the participant. In particular, we show that uncertainty
about task structure provides incentive for making these
apparently sub-optimal choices.
Some studies have suggested that behavior in two independent
option tasks is suboptimal when compared to an optimal model
[24–27] —that people explore too little to find the better option
quicker, or explore too much, continuing to choose an option that
should have been discarded. We tested whether these types of trials
are better predicted by the learning model.
By under-exploration, we mean that subjects choose differently
than an independent model for trials where the independent
model selects the option with lower reward proportion (because
the counts are low), and thus the independent model has a higher
Figure 5. Full behavior on diagnostic trials as a function of evidence and confidence. Diagnostic trials are those in which there is at least
one disagreement between the models. For each of these trials, we compute the evidence and confidence of each option. A cell in the graph
indicates the empirical probability that the model (or participants) pick the better option as a function of evidence and confidence. The right panels
show prediction rate of different models in diagnostic trials. All pair-wise differences are significant (pv:05) A) Trials in Independent Environment
B) Trials in Coupled Environment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g005
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we mean that subjects choose differently than an independent
model for trials where the independent model selects the option
with higher reward proportion and high counts—i.e., the option
chosen is clearly less rewarding and there should be nothing left to
learn from it. A percentage of trials are under-explorative
(M~9%, n~1910) or over-explorative (M~10%, n~1984) out
of the number of trials in the independent environment
(N~19104). The learning model was able to predict most of the
under-exploratory trials (M~79:8% 78,81 ½  ), and significantly
more trials than other models, pone{tailedv0:01 (see Fig. 7A). The
learning model also predicted over-exploratory trials (M~11:2%
9:8,12:7 ½  ) better than the other models, pone{tailed~0:04, but the
predictive performance is relatively poor (Fig. 7A).
The subset of trials classified as over-exploratory by the
independent model were not well predicted by any of the models,
which essentially corresponds to an anti-diagonal trend in
participants decisions in the evidence versus confidence space
(see Fig. 6, left panel). For negative evidence and positive
confidence and for positive evidence but negative confidence,
participants choose opposite to normative predictions. Both of
these cases correspond to participants persisting in choices despite
evidence to the contrary. We believe that this pattern may be a
consequence of temporal dependence in participants choices, a
possibility we return to in the Discussion section.
Behavior in coupled environments has also been suggested to be
sub-optimal [24,25,28–31]. Given that there is no need for
exploration and the optimal behavior is inherently exploitative, we
tested whether behavior that diverged from the coupled model’s
predictions would be better predicted by the learning model. A
small percentage of trials (M~9:4%, n~1405) disagreed with the
coupled model in the coupled environment (N~14800). The
learning model predicts 17% (15:1,19:1) of these trials, and has
higher prediction rate than the independent model, although not
significant, pone{tailed~0:1.
Trials not predicted by the coupled or independent
models are task-learning trials predicted by structure
learning model. For structure learning tasks, there are decisions
purely intended to diminish the uncertainty about the structure. A
simple way to isolate these decisions is by selecting trials in which fixed
models (coupled and independent) pick one option while the structure
learning model picks the other. A Welch-Satterthwaite two-sample t-
test confirms the intuition that these trials happen earlier than other
trials within an environment, t(4256:02)~{1:9, p~0:02.F o rt h e s e
trials, the learning model was able to predict almost all of participants’
decisions (M~96:7% 94:3,98:3 ½  , N~342), and thus the fixed
models predicted almost none (M~3:2% 1:6,5:6 ½  ,N~342), exact
binomial test pone{tailedv0:01 (see Fig. 7C). Q-learning predictions
were also worse than chance on these trials M~28:8% 26:4,30:2 ½  ,
N~342), and worse than structure learning model pone{tailedv0:01.
Discussion
We have provided evidence that structure learning may be an
important missing piece in evaluating human sequential decision
making. The idea of modeling sequential decision making under
uncertainty as a structure learning problem is a natural extension of
previous work on structure learning in models of cognition [13,16] (also
see [32]), animal learning [33] and motor control (e.g., see [34]). It also
extends previous work on Bayesian approaches to modeling sequential
decision making in the Multi-armed bandits [35] by adding structure
learning. It is important to note that we have intentionally focused on
reward structure, ignoring issues involving dependencies across trials.
Clearly reward structure learning must be integrated with learning
about temporaldependencies [36] (e.g.assumptionsofa non-stationary
environment [5,37,38]).
Interestingly, there were a set of participants’ decisions that
none of the models were able to capture and that constitute 9.4%
of the data. These trials are predominately localized on positive
evidence (Eq. 4), but negative confidence (Eq. 5) levels (see Fig. 5A
and B, left panel, people column.). These choices corresponded to
persisting in choosing the worst option despite statistical evidence
supporting the better option. None of the models considered
would choose the worse option under these conditions. Partici-
pants may have limited memory or may be considering a larger
space of possible models; for example nonconstant reward rates
(allowing for nonstationary reward probabilities).
Figure 6. Better arm selection ratio. In the diagnostic trials, A) and C) Belief in coupling tracks changes in participant choices similarly to the
learning model B) and D) behavior vs. structure belief is well correlated with the learning model, but not with independent and coupled.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g006
Structure Learning in Decision-Making
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 8 December 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e1001003Although we focused on learning coupling between options, there
are other kinds of reward structure learning that may account for a
broad variety of human decision making performance. In
particular, allowing dependence between the probability of reward
at a site and previous actions can produce large changes in decision
making behavior. For example, in a ‘‘foraging’’ model where
reward is collected from a site and probabilistically replenished,
optimal strategies will produce choice sequences that alternate
between reward sites [39]. Thus uncertainty about the indepen-
dence of reward on previous actions can produce a continuum of
behavior, from maximization to probability matching. Note that
structure learning explanations for probability matching are
significantly different than explanations based on reinforcing
previously successful actions (the ‘‘law of effect’’) [40]. Instead of
explaining behavior in terms of the idiosyncrasies of a learning rule,
structure learning constitutes a fully rational response to uncertainty
about the causal structure of rewards in the environment. By
expanding the range of normative hypotheses for human decision-
making, we believe we can begin to develop more principled
accounts of human sequential decision-making.
The general alternative to the rational approach is to assume that
choice behavior reflects some fundamental limitations in sensing,
neural computation or storage. It is possible that the decisions we
could not predict in any dependent environment result from human
processing limitations. For example, one of the key decision patterns
that does not fit in the normative approach is choice stickiness, a
persistence in choosing the same option despite evidence suggesting it
would be better to switch.Thiscouldreflect a transition tomodel-free
learning in the independent environment. Participants may have
learned a policy for choosing that option based on early reward
evidence. However, we find no evidence for this possibility in our
data. Another possibility is that participants have memory limitations
that prevent them from compiling all of the evidence [35]—the
observed persistence may be sensitivity to local reward. While
limitations to human decision-making surely exist, and people are
bounded rational, our results provide evidence that decisions are also
driven by sophisticated structure learning. We believe that many
aspects of human decision-making that appears mysterious may be
the result of the brain’s attempts to acquire compact and useful
representations of the structure of its environment.
We foresee an adoption of more sophisticated models of
sequential decision-making to account for the compact represen-
tation that humans might be using to act in diverse reward
structures. While we believe that the theory to analyze these
representations is available, it has only been cautiously adopted in
Psychology and Neuroscience [35,41–43]. We have already seen
Figure 7. Model comparison in different aspects of decision-making. A and B) Performance of learning model and coupled model for decisions
not predicted by the independent model in the independent environment (separated intounder-exploratory and over-exploratory trials) C) Prediction performance
for trials where independent and coupled model prefer one option whereas the learning model prefers the other. These trials are called task learning trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001003.g007
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development of efficient computational methods to solve Bellman’s
equation (i.e. model-free RL methods like Q-learning) led to the
rapid development and application of RL methods starting in the
1980s, despite the fact that the theoretical foundations had been
laid by control theorist more than two decades prior [1,44,45].
While Robotics, for example, today hardly uses model-free
reinforcement learning to think about tasks of any level of
complexity, much work remains for model-based reinforcement
learning to make its way into mainstream human and animal
sequential decision-making analysis.
Materials and Methods
Informed consent was obtained and all investigations were
conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration
of Helsinki, under the Assurance of Compliance number
FWA00000312.
Experimental methods
Sixteen volunteers solve 32 bandit tasks, 16 for each
environment. The probabilities of rewards were randomly
sampled from a uniform distribution, and the stopping times for
each bandit task were sampled from a Geometric distribution
Nm*Geometric(1{c). The average stopping time was 48. The
order of the tasks within an environment was randomized, and the
order of presentation of the environments was randomized as well.
All subjects were exposed to the same probabilities of rewards and
stopping times.
Each option is shown in the screen as a slot machine. Subjects
pull a machine by pressing a key in the keyboard. When pulled, an
animation of the lever is shown, 200 msec later the reward appears
in the machine’s screen, and a sound mimicking dropping coins
lasts proportionally to the amount gathered. We provide several
cues, some redundant, to help subjects keep track of previous
rewards. We display the number of pulls, total reward, and the
current average reward per pull. Reward magnitudes were 0 or
100 points. The machine’s screen changes the color according to
the average reward, from red (zero points), through yellow (fifty
points), and green (one hundred points). The machine’s total
reward is shown as a pile of coins underneath it. The total score,
total pulls, and rankings within a game were presented.
All participants finished all tasks. Each participant performed 1194
trials on independent environment and 925 on the coupled en-
vironment, for a total of 33904 trials. In general, participants under-
stood the task well. No apparent outliers were found nor missed trials.
Models of sequential decision-making
The language of graphical models provides a useful framework for
describing the possible structure of rewards in the environment.
Consider an environment with several distinct reward sites that can
be sampled, but the way models generate these rewards is unknown.
In particular, rewards at each site may be independent, or there may
be a latent cause which accounts for the presence of rewards at both
sites. Uncertainty about which reward model is correct naturally
produces a mixture as the appropriate learning model. This structure
learning model is a special case of Bayesian Reinforcement Learning
(BRL), where the states of the environment are the reward sites and
the transitions between states are determined by the action of
sampling a reward site. Uncertainty about reward dynamics and
contingencies can be modeled by including within the belief state not
only reward probabilities, but also the possibility of independent or
coupled rewards. Then, the optimal balance of exploration and
exploitation in BRL results in action selection that seeks to maximize
(1) expected rewards (2) information about rewards dynamics, and (3)
information about task structure.
The belief over dynamics is effectively a probability distribution
over possible Markov Decision Processes that would explain
observables. As such, the optimal policy can be described as a
mapping from belief states to actions. In principle, the optimal
solution can be found by solving Bellman optimality equations but
generally there are countably or uncountably infinitely many states
and solutions need approximations. If we were certain which of
the two models were right, the action selection problem has known
solution for both cases, presented below.
Model with fixed independent structure. Learning and
acting in an environment like the one described in Fig. 2A is known
as the Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) problem. The MAB problem is a
special case of BRL because we can partition the belief B into a
disjoint set of beliefs about each option B~ B
1,B
2   
. Because
beliefs about non-sampled options remain frozen until sampled
again, independent learning and action selection for each option is














such that both terms inside the maximization are equal. Gittins [18]
proved that it is optimal to choose the optiona with the highestsuch
reward la (called the Gittins Index). This allows speedup of
computation by transforming a many-arm bandit problem to many 2-
arm bandit problems.
In our task, the belief about a binary reward may be represented
by a Beta Distribution with sufficient statistics parameters a,b (both
w0) such that xaDha*Bern(ha), where ha*Beta(aa,ba). Thus, the
beliefabout optiona is B
a~ aa,ba ðÞ expected rewardr(aa,ba,a) and
predicted probability of reward f(xa~1Daa,ba) are aa(aazba)
{1.
The belief state transition is bxa~x~ aazx,baz1{x ðÞ . Therefore,
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to a sufficiently large horizon. In experiments, we use c~0:98, for
which a horizon of H~1000 suffices.
Model with fixed coupled structure. Learning and acting
in coupled environments (Fig. 2B) is trivial because there is no
need to maximize information in acting. The belief state is
represented by a Beta distribution with sufficient statistics a1,b1

















The belief state transitions are Bx1~x~ a1zx,b1z1{x ðÞ and
Bx2~x~ a1z1{x,b1zx ðÞ .
ð6Þ
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restrict ourselves to the following scenario. The agent is presented
with a sequence of M bandit tasks, from m~1,...,M, each with
initially unknown Bernoulli reward probabilities and coupling.
Each task involves Nm discrete choices, where Nm is sampled from
a Geometric distribution with parameter 1{c.
Fig. 2C shows the mixture of two possible reward models shown
in Fig. 2A and B. Node c switches the mixture between the two
possible reward models and encodes part of the belief state of the
process. Notice that c is acting as a XOR gate between the two
generative models. Given that it is unknown, the probability
distribution p(c~0) is the mixed proportion for independent
reward structure and p(c~1) is the mixed proportion for coupled
reward structure. Specifically:
1. For the block: Coupling parameter c may be either 0 or 1, and
is unknown for the agent. For learning, put Bernoulli prior with
parameter w. Sample c*p(c;w)~w
c(1{w)
1{c.
2. For the bandit task m~1,...,M: Sample hj*Beta(1,1) for
parameters, all unknown for the agent. For learning, put Beta
priors hj*Beta(aj,bj), with j~1,2.
3. For choice n~1,...,Nm, with stochastic stopping time
Nm*(1{c)ct:
N Choose option 1: x1Dh1*Bern(h1)




Learning can be performed analytically. Let x be a sequence of
rewards observed. For the likelihood term p(xDh1,h2,c) in the
posterior, the observations x are independent given hj’s and c.
Hence, we just need to keep track of the number of successes (1’s)
and failures (0’s) of each option, rather than when rewards were
observed. Let sa and fa be the number of successes and failures for
option a in x. It is clear that the posterior distribution p(h1,h2,cDx)
is not closed with respect to the prior, but still by keeping track of
the counts we can compute the necessary quantities for the
Bellman’s equation in a straightforward manner.
After simple algebraic manipulation, we can obtain the
posterior distribution on coupling. At the beginning of each
bandit task, we assume the agent ‘‘resets’’ its belief about options
(si~fi~0), but the posterior over c is carried over and used as the
prior on the next bandit task. Let B(u,v)~C(u)C(v)=C(uzv) be
the Beta function, where C(u) is the Gamma function. For
simplicity, we define D:fs1,f1,s2,f2g. The marginal posterior on
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ð9Þ
The beliefs about environment dynamics, however, may still be
completely represented by the counts and prior parameters within
a task with a probability distribution about environment dynamics
as Eq. 9.
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From now on, we define BD:p(h1,h2,cDs1,f1,s2,f2) for simplic-















To obtain (12) using dynamic programming for a horizon H,
there will be a total of (1=24)(1zH)(2zH)(3zH)(4zH)~
O(H4) computations which represent different occurrences of si,fi
out of 4H possible histories of rewards. This dramatic reduction
allows us to be relatively accurate in our approximation to the
optimal value of an action.
We use a horizon H~55 for computing values with Eq. 12. Notice
that we can recover the action selection of fixed models by computing
V(...,w~0,...) for the independent model and V(...,w~1,...)
for the coupled model. However, we use Eq. 6 for the independent
model and Eq. 7 for the coupled environment because is much more
efficient. We checked that actions of the learning model when the task
certainty is very high (p(c~1D:)&0o rp(c~1D:)&1)d on o td i f f e r
f r o mE q .6o rE q .7 ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Q-learning with soft-max. It is possible to optimally act
without a model of the environment by using what is known as
model-free reinforcement learning. One of the most popular
model-free reinforcement learning algorithms is known as Q-
learning, which can compute the optimal value of an action after
infinitely many observations for each action and states [19].
However, Q-learning does not have a principle for performing
exploratory actions and it is usually coupled with occasional
random actions (e.g., see [10,12] for a contrast with Bayesian
reinforcement learning). For example, the e-greedy action
selection chooses a random action an e fraction of the time and
the soft-max action selection uses the current estimates of values to
construct a distribution on the probability where, roughly
speaking, actions with higher value estimates have higher
probability of selection. In practice, e-greedy and soft-max Q-
learning are extremely fast methods for making decisions, but they
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base comparison. Suppose that the value of each option at time t is
Qt(1) and Qt(2), then the action selection is random and driven by
the following soft-max rule:
p(aDQt(1),Qt(2),y)!exp yQt(a) ðÞ , ð13Þ
where y has the following interpretation: a large value (e.g.,
y??) indicates that the agent will always choose the option with
highest Q, a value y~0 indicates that the agent will pick an option
uniformly at random, and a negative value (e.g., y?{?)
indicates that agent tends to choose in opposition to what is
prescribed by the Q values.
After taking an action a, interacting with the environment and
receiving a reward r, the agent updates its estimation of the values




where a is known as the learning rate and c is the discount factor. A
learning rate a~0 indices that the agent won’t consider new
rewards in the estimation of Q, while a learning rate a~1
indicates that the agent will consider only the last reward in the
estimation and not past rewards.
Q-learning needs an initial estimation of the value of each
option (Q0(1) and Q0(2)), the learning rate a and the parameter y
for the soft-max rule. For our data analysis, we fit these parameters
per participant so as to maximize the prediction rate of the Q-
learning model.
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